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1. The Mental Dimension: 
A Phenomenological Approach to Documents 
 
NWL: In a very interesting article in Journal of Documentation, Tim 
Gorichanaz and K. F. Latham (2016) present a model for a holistic analysis of 
documents. I will start with their discussion of Michael Buckland’s criticism 
of work in document theory for a lack of attention to the mental dimension. 
They say:  
Thus far, the literature in document theory has focused on the physical 
and social aspects of documents and lacks deep consideration of the 
active role of the human involved (Buckland, 2015). Document studies 
is in need of a coherent body of literature that examines “the 
individual’s mental relationship with documents” (Buckland, 2015, 
preprint p. 8). Latham (2012, 2014) also notes the missing individual 
in document studies and presented a route to bridge the gap through 
phenomenology. (Gorichanaz & Latham, 2016, p. 1115, emphasis 
mine)  
To address the mental dimension, they present a model based in 
phenomenology, but it’s unclear how such an approach can be “holistic” as 
they imply. 
 
KFL: Our initial foray into using phenomenology as a point of departure 
came after several claims from the document community that there is a lack of 
“deep consideration of the active role of the human involved” (Gorichanaz & 
Latham, 2016, p. 1115), especially from Buckland (2014, 2015) and myself 
(Latham 2012, 2014). Phenomenology seeks understanding through the 
lifeworld, and the lifeworld is holistic—in other words, it involves all aspects 
of the world as lived. This means that none of the aspects of a document or 
document experience are left out or weighed more heavily than any other. 
What Lund (2004, 2009) calls the social, mental and material are all there.  
 Methodologically, phenomenology allowed us to suggest tools for 
analysis by which to expand on Lund’s (2009) and Skare’s (2009) previous 
work. Phenomenology’s concerns with parts, wholes, and moments 
(Sokolowski, 2000) is another reason we felt that, methodologically, it could 
be very useful, as we wanted to include both analysis and synthesis. 
 
NWL: You say “world as lived.” What about what’s not lived? Shouldn’t that 
be taken into account, too, for an account to be truly holistic? Otherwise aren’t 
you just limited to a person’s mental content? Like many humanities 
approaches, phenomenology seems to value doing things with the head, and 
forgetting about the hands.  
 
TG: It’s a common misconception that phenomenology is purely mental, that 
it focuses on meanings alone. It takes lived meaning as the point of departure, 
but its true strength is in exposing the tension between meanings and what 
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causes the meanings—that is, external reality. It really wants to get to the 
causes, but it recognizes that this may be impossible. Still, through concepts 
such as intersubjectivity—recognizing that different individuals can share 
aspects of their experiences—it can make some ground. There’s also a strand 
of phenomenology called radical phenomenology, or nonintentional 
phenomenology, and this purports to account for phenomena in reality so as to 
be independent of human observers (see Henry, 2009).  
 
NWL: Even so, the basis in phenomenology still gives priority to meaning—
to the mental dimension—and that is a serious problem for me! In my view, 
the mental dimension must be weighted the same as the social and physical 
dimensions. You cannot have a document without having all three equally-
weighted dimensions in place.  
 
KFL: But our model does address all three, and we do not claim that any of 
the three has higher priority than the others. We don’t believe that 
phenomenology inherently privileges the mental dimension. 
 
2. What is a Document? 
 
NWL: Let’s discuss the model you present for what you call “documental 
becoming” (Figure 1). You say, “Because perception is the action through 
which documents are ascertained, the senses play a central role in documental 
becoming. …  Buckland (1997) described documents as being made from the 
human processing of objects” (Gorichanaz & Latham, 2016, p. 1119). But all 
this does is account for the mental process of perceiving a given object.  
I believe it is very problematic to make the status of a document only a 
matter of perception, and not of conception or production of an “object.”  How 
is it possible to talk about a holistic analysis of documents, when you leave out 
the physical and social processes and only focus on the mental processes?  
In 1967, the French literary scholar Roland Barthes published an essay 
on “The Death of the Author” (Barthes, 1977) in which he claimed that the 
relationship between the author and his biography does not have relevance for 
a reader in understanding the text; rather, it is the reader who creates the text. 
Your argument would seem to suit Barthes very well. I’ll ask you, therefore: Is 
not the producer of the document relevant in the perception of the document? 
I will claim that the author does have some relevance for the 
perception of the document. Not his biography, necessarily, but his social 
setting, choice of media and way of using media. That does not mean the 
author means everything. The reader also means definitively much. It is a 
matter of exchange, although the reader very seldom has the opportunity to 
directly respond to the author. 
 
KFL: Whether the producer of the document is involved is up to the person 
doing the document analysis. Sometimes the physical producer will be 
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important, but not always. The point of the framework is to provide a flexible 
structure for an interested person to apply it in a way that suits them. At this 
point, there is nothing you cannot do with it. In documental becoming (Act 
One), one can ask questions about how the document came to be as it is now, 
i.e. how it was made, who made it, where it came from, etc. 
 
NWL: In my view, if the document is understood as a product, then the 
process of production needs to be investigated. Your model of documental 
becoming talks about the perception of the object, but not its physical creation. 
 
KFL: It can be either. I would say that if one chooses to explore the creation 
of the initial document, then the document transaction is between the maker 
and the thing itself (song, video, painting, etc.). We purposefully did not say at 
what point in the life of the object (or person) that the becoming occurs—that 
must be defined by the researcher. 
 
3. The Process of Documentation 
 
NWL: So, is documentation something different from documental becoming? 
Your model distinguishes the material object, the creation of the object 
(documentation) and the perception of the object (documental becoming). This 
seems to leave the vast majority of documentation outside of documental 
becoming—not to mention document status. Shouldn’t documental becoming, 
if we need the concept at all, be part of documentation?  
 
TG: As I understand it, documentation is the process of creating a physical 
object (keeping in mind that sound waves and electromagnetic impulses are 
physical). As you articulated (Lund, 2004), this process entails a human 
producer, a set of instruments for producing, a mode of using these 
instruments and the resulting document; and this process is constrained and 
enabled by any number of factors, from socioeconomic pressures to individual 
whims. Some of these factors are “baked into” the finished document, while 
others can only be discovered by looking at the documentation process—and 
certainly there are shades of gradation in between.  
For instance, consider a carved wooden stump, with a slightly concave 
and polished top, positioned on a floor, as a document being seen for the first 
time in hundreds of years or more. Virtually any human (or cat) who sees this 
will see it as a place to sit. Assuming it was indeed made as a seat, this is an 
example of a baked-in factor. Some people—experts—may be able to tell 
whether the maker used stone or iron tools; this evidence is baked-in, but it is 
not readily apprehensible to everyone. But virtually nobody would be able to 
say what forest the wood came from, why this tree was chosen or whether the 
stool was originally a gift.  
This begins to illustrate the notion of documental becoming. Of course, 
the document becomes for the producer as the result of the documentation 
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process, but it also becomes for countless beholders later on. For any given 
beholder, the wooden stump will have any number of associations that may or 
may not have anything to do with the documentation process. Maybe the 
wooden stump reminds me of a lakeside lodge in northern Wisconsin, as well 
as the videogame Super Mario World. At first blush, the first association 
makes sense, the second less so. (But if I told you I spent some of my 
summers in such a lodge playing Super Nintendo, then it might make more 
sense.) 
I’d suggest that the intrinsic aspect of a document—its material 
structure and baked-in object knowledge—goes a long way in constituting a 
document’s meaning. This is why many people can encounter a given 
document and often get more or less the same meaning out of it. But it will 
never be exactly the same—much less the case across cultures and in the case 
of numinous experiences. That’s why we felt compelled to formally recognize 
the extrinsic, abtrinsic and adtrinsic information that go into all instances of 
documental becoming.  
To put it succinctly: Documentation is one kind of documental 
becoming, wherein the document’s intrinsic information is modified.  
 
KFL: I see it a bit differently. For me, if a museum visitor walks through an 
exhibit and encounters an object, the transaction could be considered a type of 
documentation.  
 
NWL: That is the case for me, too. And you need to consider the process 
more fully in all examples. The major problem is that you put too much focus 
on the object as it is. You actually risk objectifying the whole process. Your 
model lacks recognition of the medium and the mode that interface between 
the person and the object in the process of documentation. How can you deal 
with medium and mode in your model?  
 
TG: This is a well-placed question, one that we did not directly consider in 
our model. This is because, as I say above, I view documental becoming as a 
process of which documentation is one specific kind. A peculiarity of our 
model is that it does not represent time very well; rather, we sought to 
represent specific moments of document transaction.  
This becomes a limitation when it comes to medium and mode, as 
these concepts denote processes that unfold in time. In the parlance of our 
model, the extension of medium and mode falls under intrinsic (and, to some 
extent extrinsic) information. As I see it, every meaning leads to a new 
meaning. That is, the four informations cohere into a meaning that is then 
carried forth in the situation as the four informations come together anew, ad 
infinitum. In a given case of documental becoming, perhaps the four 
informations don’t change very much. But in a situation of emotional tumult, 
for instance, perhaps the abtrinsic information changes rapidly. Likewise, 
during a case of documentation, the intrinsic information is likely changing 
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rapidly. It is the nature of the changes in intrinsic information across time that 
constitutes the concepts of medium and mode.  Yes, that is such a complicated 
explanation as to verge on the absurd; for those who value parsimony, perhaps 
we ought to find a better way to represent the time dimension in our 
framework.  
 
KFL: We did mention temporality in the framework but we weren’t exactly 
sure how to structure it into an analysis, so in the end we left that to the 
researcher. I encountered this problem in my use of the framework in my 
DOCAM ’16 paper (see Latham, 2016, in this volume). My analysis was 
centered on a moment of realization about Irish peat bogs, but my realization 
involved many years of memories and understandings leading up to that 
moment, as well as changes in those understandings after the moment. I 
wasn’t sure how to factor all of that in to the scenario. So, right there, we have 
an example of applying the framework and learning what we need to do to 
refine it. But, here’s what using the Framework did do for me: Applying it, I 
was able to figure out what changed and what didn’t in the document 
transaction (since I was trying to sort out “floating fixity”) in a holistic but 
clinical way. I feel that the exercise was extremely successful and I went from 
hazy to clear on what happened in the Irish peat bog moment. 
 
NWL: But it’s still not the whole picture. Think about The Scream, Edvard 
Munch’s famous painting. There’s not just one The Scream, though. In fact, 
Munch created five versions of the image using different techniques and 
tools—painting, lithography and pastels. Between the artist and the museum 
guest, you have the curator choosing one of the versions (voluntarily or 
depending on which one the museum has) and placing it in the certain way in 
a gallery. From this, the museum guest creates their document that we could 
call “Munch’s The Scream.” And then consider how, when the image turned 
100 in 1993 and entered the public domain, copies and remediations of The 
Scream were created in all sorts of formats and media. Now there are 
countless producers of The Scream. All this shows how the different people 
and institutions play a role in the documentation process as a whole. 
 
KFL: What you say is true, and I agree that there can be (and often is) a 
“catchment area” of versions of a document that are all equally involved (see 
Latour and Lowe, 2010, for this concept). At the same time, a person doesn’t 
need to know the whole history of an image to have a valid experience with a 
painting. We sought to provide a way to account for those individual 
experiences, which may not be “true” from a socio-historical perspective, as 
well as those broader social and historical perspectives. We’ve already 
discussed individual experiences, but let me outline how our model could be 
used to draw up a broader account. 
Act Two of our framework, which we called “documental being,” 
could be used to investigate the original creation and creator of a document 
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through any of the three frames (parts of documents, individual documents 
and document systems). In documental being, one can ask questions about 
documentation, especially in Frame 3 (document systems). Again, we left the 
definition of this broad so that researchers could have flexibility to insert their 
own approach. One could take an approach to documentation—let’s say the 
act of cataloging a museum object—in the context of document systems. We 
did not insert judgment or weight into any of these levels because we wanted 
the researcher to decide. If I decided to look at the social aspect of cataloging 
museum objects, for instance, I could decide that is my approach, state the 
conceptual framework behind it, then proceed to do an analysis on the 
situation using any of the three frames to help answer my questions. Again, 
this is a tool to help document research, not a judgment call. 
 
NWL: Think about this. Edvard Munch documented his capacity as artist by 
making his art. The curator is documenting his capacity as curator by putting 
together an exhibition of Munch and making Munch’s painting a museum 
document. The spectator is documenting her capacity as spectator by creating 
a third document through her physical senses as well as her cognitive senses. 
In this way we have three different documents, produced at three different 
times, which share a lot of things. You can talk about a complex of 
documents, all almost being the same, but not completely. How can your 
model deal with that?  
 
TG: For us, they’re three different documents, so they must be dealt with one 
at a time. By going through the analysis, we’ll find that the intrinsic 
information—the physical stuff of the painting—is the thread that holds the 
three together. But really, I’d suggest these three document experiences are 
going to be much more different than you imply! In any case, your point about 
needing to better represent medium and mode, and in a more active way, is 
well taken.  
 
KFL: I slightly disagree with Tim on this one. I think that our framework 
allows you to recognize this “complex” of documents—absolutely—what it 
does is give you the terminology to sort it all out and see what is going on. 
This is precisely what it did for me in the Irish peat bog example. Document 
experiences (processes, perception, physicality, all of it) are complex and to 
separate them out unnaturally continues the problem that got us to the point of 
writing this article. I would say we have privileged certain aspects of that 
experience, and need to equally consider all possibilities. The fact that the 
same document (the painting) is “documented” differently by curator and 
visitor is a fact that should always be considered but has not typically. Again, 
the researcher’s initial questions and interests are paramount here. What is the 









NWL: I also think we need to discuss the issue of complementarity. As I 
wrote in my paper from the SCARLID conference in Oulu (Lund, 2004), I 
believe documentation is a complementary process and cannot only be 
considered as a physical process, nor as social process or a mental process, but 
rather it must be considered a matter of all three complementary processes. 
For me, there’s value in keeping them separate. Only by analyzing the 
processes individually can you do them justice and really expose the tensions 
between them.  To study them well, they require different approaches.  
 
TG: I see what you mean, and I agree with you to a point. I follow the work of 
Roger Scruton (2014) who presents a view of cognitive dualism. Scruton 
argues that the empirical, objective world of science is incommensurate with 
the subjective world of consciousness. You can either see pixels and hear 
sounds, or you can see images and hear music—not both. But from a distance, 
you can consider both sides of the coin and explore how they intersect, as 
Skare (2009) did. It’s engaging with the Hard Problem, essentially—
wondering about how consciousness arises from a mass of gray matter.  
 
KFL: I see what Niels is saying, and I recognize that this works for certain 
applications, but I see it differently. I believe that separating out social, 
material, and mental creates a false situation. A person does not exist in the 
world “only socially,” for instance; while they are “being social,” they are also 
in a material world and “mentally” processing the world. This is where 
phenomenology comes in to play for me. Trying to parse out these always-all-
at-once aspects of the world into distinct parts does not represent actual 
situations. 
 
NWL: On the contrary, I insist on a-synthesis. I believe that trying to 
synthesize, you lose the details that matter. For instance, I believe we are 
having a conceptual problem with using the word “documentation” for so 
many things. It’s creating confusion. It might be better to keep them separate: 
 Documentation – physical dimension 
 Communication – social dimension 
 Information – mental dimension 
At the same time, we might use documentation as an overarching concept for 
all three processes running simultaneously both for the producer and the user. 
Perhaps we should abandon the notion of “user” and recognize both the author 
and the reader as producers.  
 
KFL: We approached it differently in our model and we believe that analysis 
and synthesis should both be used in tandem. Let’s look again at Act One to 
show the back and forth use of analysis and synthesis. The four informations 
are analytical tools meant to “take apart” a document experience. Once the 
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whole is looked at in each of these four ways, we bring them back together to 
address the document experience.  We recognize that the boundaries between 
the four informations we describe are diffuse in many cases (see Gorichanaz 
& Latham, 2016, pp. 1121–1122). If we made (or claimed) them to be 
concrete, we would be doing a disservice to scholarship around documents. 
The four informations are a start, a suggestion. We need everyone to play 
around with these, apply them, and tell us what works and what does not, what 
is missing and what is just plain wrong. A strength is that this approach 
attempts to emulate reality: nothing is concrete, and fluidity occurs. The very 
fuzziness is a strength. A weakness is that this fuzziness might make it 
difficult to follow. Since we would like to put this framework to work and get 
feedback, we hope that over time we can refine and adjust it.  
It’s also worth mentioning that, in writing the portion about the four 
informations, Tim and I had a lot of back and forth and some disagreement, 
especially in terminology. Finally, we had to just settle on something so we 
could move forward, publish, and get feedback. I, for instance, do not like the 
word “information.” But really, when you are juggling words like “object,” 
“document,” and “information,” things get really sticky really fast. We had to 
“just do it,” as the famous shoe people say. 
 
TG: I’d also add that I see our framework as more of a rough guide than a 
clearly defined roadmap. I’d contend that all documents involve all four 
informations, but I’m sure different people would put the same information in 
different buckets. The point isn’t to lock you into a rigid model; rather, it’s to 
give you some suggestions as to where to start looking.  
 
KFL: As I see it, Niels, your 100% social, mental, and material are all there, 
all the time in our model. But I do see now the ramifications of our different 
ways of dealing with this. In the end, I suspect you will insist on a-synthesis 
just as fervently we as insist on synthesis. 
 
NWL: Yes, Kiersten, I will insist on the a-synthesis. I better understand your 
approach now, although I'm still not convinced why documental becoming is a 
better overarching concept than documentation. I think that the time and space 
dimensions are very important to work on in detail, to get at the very process 
of documentation (or documental becoming)—so, there’s lots to discuss in our 
future works.  
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